unifying behavioral and response diversity
Appendix for " Unifying Behavioral and Response Diversity for Open-ended Learning in Zero-sum Games " Table of Contents
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1 To prove Theorem 1, we need the help of the following Lemma See Proposition 7.1 in [3]. Now we can prove our Theorem 1. Proof. For games with only one step (normal-form games, functional-form games), there is only one fixed state. Therefore, the distribution of state-action is equivalent to the distribution of the action. A.2 Proof of Theorem 2 Let us restate our Theorem 2 Theorem 2. For a given empirical payoff matrix A RM N and the reward vector aM+1 for policy M + ||(I A>(A>))aM+1||2, (18) where (A>) is the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of A>, and σmin(A) is the minimum singular value of A. Proof. The last equation comes from the analytic calculation of min1>β=1 ||β (A>) aM+1||2 using Lagrangian.
Towards Unifying Behavioral and Response Diversity for Open-ended Learning in Zero-sum Games
Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of diverse policies via open-ended learning is an attractive solution, which can generate auto-curricula to avoid being exploited. However, in conventional open-ended learning algorithms, there are no widely accepted definitions for diversity, making it hard to construct and evaluate the diverse policies. In this work, we summarize previous concepts of diversity and work towards offering a unified measure of diversity in multi-agent open-ended learning to include all elements in Markov games, based on both Behavioral Diversity (BD) and Response Diversity (RD).
Towards Unifying Behavioral and Response Diversity for Open-ended Learning in Zero-sum Games
Measuring and promoting policy diversity is critical for solving games with strong non-transitive dynamics where strategic cycles exist, and there is no consistent winner (e.g., Rock-Paper-Scissors). With that in mind, maintaining a pool of diverse policies via open-ended learning is an attractive solution, which can generate auto-curricula to avoid being exploited. However, in conventional open-ended learning algorithms, there are no widely accepted definitions for diversity, making it hard to construct and evaluate the diverse policies. In this work, we summarize previous concepts of diversity and work towards offering a unified measure of diversity in multi-agent open-ended learning to include all elements in Markov games, based on both Behavioral Diversity (BD) and Response Diversity (RD). For the reward dynamics, we propose RD to characterize diversity through the responses of policies when encountering different opponents. We also show that many current diversity measures fall in one of the categories of BD or RD but not both.